Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale Respondent v Islington London Borough Council Appellant
 2 W.L.R. 802
House of Lords
Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Woolf, and Lord Lloyd of Berwick
1995 July 10, 11, 12, 13; 1996 May 22
22 May. LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY.
My Lords, this appeal is concerned with a transaction known as an interest rate swap. Under such a transaction, one party (the fixed rate payer) agrees to pay the other over a certain period interest at a fixed rate on a notional capital sum; and the other party (the floating rate payer) agrees to pay to the former over the same period interest on the same notional sum at a market rate determined in accordance with a certain formula. Interest rate swaps can fulfil many purposes, ranging from pure speculation to more useful purposes such as the hedging of liabilities. They are in law wagers, but they are not void as such because they are excluded from the regime of the Gaming Acts by section 63 of the Financial Services Act 1986.
One form of interest rate swap involves what is called an upfront payment, i.e. a capital sum paid by one party to the other, which will be balanced by an adjustment of the parties' respective liabilities. Thus, as in the present case, the fixed rate payer may make an upfront payment to the floating rate payer, and in consequence the rate of interest payable by the fixed rate payer is reduced to a rate lower than the rate which would otherwise have been payable by him. The practical effect is to achieve a form of borrowing by, in this example, the floating rate payer through the medium of the interest rate swap transaction. It appears that it was this feature which, in particular, attracted local authorities to enter into transactions of this kind, since they enabled local authorities subject to rate-capping to obtain upfront payments uninhibited by the relevant statutory controls.
At all events, local authorities began to enter into transactions of this kind soon after they came into use in the early 1980s. At that time, there was thought to be no risk involved in entering into such transactions with local authorities. Financially, they were regarded as secure; and it was assumed that such transactions were within their powers. However, as is well known, in Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council 2 A.C. 1 your Lordships' House, restoring the decision of the Divisional Court  2 Q.B. 697, held that such transactions were ultra vires the local authorities who had entered into them. It is unnecessary for present purposes to examine the basis of that decision; though I wish to record that it caused grave concern among financial institutions, and especially foreign banks, which had entered into such transactions with local authorities in good faith, with no idea that a rule as technical as the ultra vires doctrine might undermine what they saw as a perfectly legitimate commercial transaction. There then followed litigation in which banks and other financial institutions concerned sought to recover from the local authorities with which they had dealt the balance of the money paid by them, together with interest. Out of the many actions so commenced, two were selected as test cases. These were the present case, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington Borough Council, and Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Sandwell Borough Council. Both681cases came on for hearing before Hobhouse J.  4 All E.R. 890. Your Lordships are concerned only with the former case. In a powerful judgment Hobhouse J. held that the plaintiffs ("the bank") were entitled to recover from the defendants ("the council") the net balance outstanding on the transaction between the parties, viz. the difference between the upfront payment of £2.5m. paid by the bank to the council on 18 June 1987, and the total of four semi-annual interest payments totalling £1,354,474.07 paid by the council to the bank between December 1987 and June 1989, leaving a net balance of £1,145,525.93 which the judge ordered the council to pay to the bank. He held the money to be recoverable by the bank either as money had and received by the council to the use of the bank, or as money which in equity the bank was entitled to trace into the hands of the council and have repaid out of the council's assets. He decided that the bank's right to restitution at common law arose from the fact that the payment made by the bank to the council was made under a purported contract which, unknown to both parties, was ultra vires the council and so void, no consideration having been given for the making of the payment. The decision by the judge, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal  1 W.L.R. 938, raised important questions in the law of restitution, which are of great interest to lawyers specialising in this field. Yet it is an extraordinary feature of the present appeal to your Lordships' House that the judge's decision on the substantive right of recovery at common law does not fall for consideration by your Lordships' House. The appeal of the council is confined to one point only - the question of interest.
The judge ordered that the council should pay compound interest on the sum awarded against them, calculated at six-monthly rests from 1 April 1990 to the date of judgment. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judge's decision to award compound interest but, allowing a cross-appeal by the bank, ordered that interest should run from the date of receipt of the upfront payment. Both the judge and the Court of Appeal held that they were entitled to invoke against the council the equitable jurisdiction to award compound interest, on the basis that the bank was entitled to succeed against the council in an equitable proprietary claim. The foundation for the bank's equitable proprietary claim lay in the decision of this House in Sinclair v. Brougham A.C. 398. Since that decision has for long been controversial, the Appellate Committee invited argument on the question whether the House should depart from the decision despite the fact that it has stood for many years.
The shape of the case
Once the character of an interest swap transaction has been identified and understood, and it is appreciated that, because the transaction was beyond the powers of the council, it was void ab initio, the basic question is whether the law can restore the parties to the position they were in before they entered into the transaction. That is, of course, the function of the law of restitution. I feel bound to say that, in the present case, there ought to be no difficulty about that at all. This is because the case is concerned solely with money. All that has to be done is to order that each party should pay back the money it has received - or, more sensibly, to682strike a balance, and order that the party who has received most should repay the balance; and then to make an appropriate order for interest in respect of that balance. It should be as simple as that. and yet we find ourselves faced with a mass of difficult problems, and struggling to reconcile a number of difficult cases.
I must confess that, like all the judges who have been involved in these cases, I too have found myself struggling in this way. But in the end I have come to realise the importance of keeping my eyes on the simple outline of the case which I have just described; and I have discovered that, if one does that - if one keeps one's eyes open above the thicket of case law in which we can so easily become enclosed - the solution of the problem in the present case becomes much more simple. In saying this, I do not wish in any way to criticise the judges who have been grappling with the case at first instance and in the Court of Appeal, within the confines of the doctrine of precedent by which they are bound. On the contrary, they are entitled to our gratitude and respect. The masterly judgment of Hobhouse J., in particular, has excited widespread admiration. But it is the great advantage of a supreme court that, not only does it have the great benefit of assistance from the judgments of the courts below, but also it has a greater freedom to mould, and remould, the authorities to ensure that practical justice is done within a framework of principle. The present case provides an excellent example of a case in which this House should take full advantage of that freedom.
The three problems
There are three reasons why the present case has become so complicated. The first is that, in our law of restitution, there has developed an understanding that money can only be recovered on the ground of failure of consideration if that failure is total. The second is that because, in particular, of the well known but controversial decision of this House in Sinclair v. Brougham, it has come to be understood that a trust may be imposed in cases such as the present where the incapacity of one of the parties has the effect that the transaction is void. The third is that our law of interest has developed in a fragmentary and unsatisfactory manner, and in consequence insufficient attention has been given to the jurisdiction to award compound interest.
I propose at the outset to devote a little attention to each of these matters.
(1) Total failure of consideration
There has long been a desire among restitution lawyers to escape from the unfortunate effects of the so-called rule that money is only recoverable at common law on the ground of failure of consideration where the failure is total, by reformulating the rule upon a more principled basis; and signs that this will in due course be done are appearing in judgments throughout the common law world, as appropriate cases arise for decision. It is fortunate however that, in the present case, thanks (I have no doubt) to the admirable researches of counsel, a line of authority was discovered which had escaped the attention of the scholars who work in this field.683This line of authority was concerned with contracts for annuities which were void if certain statutory formalities were not complied with. They were not therefore concerned with contracts void by reason of the incapacity of one of the parties. Even so, they were concerned with cases in which payments had been made, so to speak, both ways; and the courts had to decide whether they could, in such circumstances, do justice by restoring the parties to their previous positions. They did not hesitate to do so, by ascertaining the balance of the account between the parties, and ordering the repayment of the balance. Moreover the form of action by which this was achieved was the old action for money had and received - what we nowadays call a personal claim in restitution at common law. With this precedent before him, Hobhouse J. felt free to make a similar order in the present case; and in this he was self-evidently right.
The most serious problem which has remained in this connection is the theoretical question whether recovery can here be said to rest upon the ground of failure of consideration. Hobhouse J. thought not. He considered that the true ground in these cases, where the contract is void, is to be found in the absence, rather than the failure, of consideration; and in this he was followed by the Court of Appeal. This had the effect that the courts below were not troubled by the question whether there had been a total failure of consideration.
The approach so adopted may have found its origin in the idea, to be derived from a well known passage in the speech of Viscount Simon L.C. in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. A.C. 32, 48, that a failure of consideration only occurs where there has been a failure of performance by the other party of his obligation under a contract which was initially binding. But the concept of failure of consideration need not be so narrowly confined. In particular it appears from the annuity cases themselves that the courts regarded them as cases of failure of consideration; and concern has been expressed by a number of restitution lawyers that the approach of Hobhouse J. is contrary to principle and could, if accepted, lead to undesirable consequences: see Professor Birks, "No Consideration: Restitution after Void Contracts" (1993) 23 W.A.L.R. 195; Mr. W. J. Swadling, "Restitution for No Consideration"  R.L.R. 73 and Professor Burrows, "Swaps and the Friction between Common Law and Equity"  R.L.R. 15. However since there is before your Lordships no appeal from the decision that the bank was entitled to recover the balance of the payments so made in a personal claim in restitution, the precise identification of the ground of recovery was not explored in argument before the Appellate Committee. It would therefore be inappropriate to express any concluded view upon it. Even so, I think it right to record that there appears to me to be considerable force in the criticisms which have been expressed; and I shall, when considering the issues on this appeal, bear in mind the possibility that it may be right to regard the ground of recovery as failure of consideration.
(2) A proprietary claim in restitution
I have already stated that restitution in these cases can be achieved by means of a personal claim in restitution. The question has however arisen684whether the bank should also have the benefit of an equitable proprietary claim in the form of a resulting trust. The immediate reaction must be - why should it? Take the present case. The parties have entered into a commercial transaction. The transaction has, for technical reasons, been held to be void from the beginning. Each party is entitled to recover its money, with the result that the balance must be repaid. But why should the plaintiff bank be given the additional benefits which flow from a proprietary claim, for example the benefit of achieving priority in the event of the defendant's insolvency? After all, it has entered into a commercial transaction, and so taken the risk of the defendant's insolvency, just like the defendant's other creditors who have contracted with it, not to mention other creditors to whom the defendant may be liable to pay damages in tort.
I feel bound to say that I would not at first sight have thought that an equitable proprietary claim in the form of a trust should be made available to the bank in the present case, but for two things. The first is the decision of this House in Sinclair v. Brougham A.C. 398, which appears to provide authority that a resulting trust may indeed arise in a case such as the present. The second is that on the authorities there is an equitable jurisdiction to award the plaintiff compound interest in cases where the defendant is a trustee. It is the combination of these two factors which has provided the foundation for the principal arguments advanced on behalf of the bank in support of its submission that it was entitled to an award of compound interest. I shall have to consider the question of availability of an equitable proprietary claim, and the effect of Sinclair v. Brougham, in some depth in a moment. But first I wish to say a few words on the subject of interest.
One would expect to find, in any developed system of law, a comprehensive and reasonably simple set of principles by virtue of which the courts have power to award interest. Since there are circumstances in which the interest awarded should take the form of compound interest, those principles should specify the circumstances in which compound interest, as well as simple interest, may be awarded; and the power to award compound interest should be available both at law and in equity. Nowadays, especially since it has been established (see National Bank of Greece S.A. v. Pinios Shipping Co. No. 1 1 A.C. 637) that banks may, by the custom of bankers, charge compound interest upon advances made by them to their customers, one would expect to find that the principal cases in which compound interest may be awarded would be commercial cases.
Sadly, however, that is not the position in English law. Unfortunately, the power to award compound interest is not available at common law. The power is available in equity; but at present that power is, for historical reasons, exercised only in relation to certain specific classes of claim, in particular proceedings against trustees for an account. An important - I believe the most important - question in the present case is whether that jurisdiction should be developed to apply in a commercial context, as in the present case.685
Equitable proprietary claims
I now turn to consider the question whether an equitable proprietary claim was available to the bank in the present case.
Ever since the law of restitution began, about the middle of this century, to be studied in depth, the role of equitable proprietary claims in the law of restitution has been found to be a matter of great difficulty. The legitimate ambition of restitution lawyers has been to establish a coherent law of restitution, founded upon the principle of unjust enrichment; and since certain equitable institutions, notably the constructive trust and the resulting trust, have been perceived to have the function of reversing unjust enrichment, they have sought to embrace those institutions within the law of restitution, if necessary moulding them to make them fit for that purpose. Equity lawyers, on the other hand, have displayed anxiety that in this process the equitable principles underlying these institutions may become illegitimately distorted; and though equity lawyers in this country are nowadays much more sympathetic than they have been in the past towards the need to develop a coherent law of restitution, and to identify the proper role of the trust within that rubric of the law, they remain concerned that the trust concept should not be distorted, and also that the practical consequences of its imposition should be fully appreciated. There is therefore some tension between the aims and perceptions of these two groups of lawyers, which has manifested itself in relation to the matters under consideration in the present case.
In the present case, however, it is not the function of your Lordships' House to rewrite the agenda for the law of restitution, nor even to identify the role of equitable proprietary claims in that part of the law. The judicial process is neither designed for, nor properly directed towards, such objectives. The function of your Lordships' House is simply to decide the questions at issue before it in the present case; and the particular question now under consideration is whether, where money has been paid by a party to a contract which is ultra vires the other party and so void ab initio, he has the benefit of an equitable proprietary claim in respect of the money so paid. Moreover the manner in which this question has arisen before this House renders it by no means easy to address. First of all, the point was not debated in any depth in the courts below, because they understood that they were bound by Sinclair v. Brougham A.C. 398 to hold that such a claim was here available. But second, the point has arisen only indirectly in this case, since it is relevant only to the question whether the court here has power to make an award of compound interest. It is a truism that, in deciding a question of law in any particular case, the courts are much influenced by considerations of practical justice, and especially by the results which would flow from the recognition of a particular claim on the facts of the case before the court. Here, however, an award of compound interest provides no such guidance, because it is no more than a consequence which is said to flow, for no more than historical reasons, from the availability of an equitable proprietary claim. It therefore provides no guidance on the question whether such a claim should here be available.686
In these circumstances I regard it as particularly desirable that your Lordships should, so far as possible, restrict the inquiry to the actual questions at issue in this appeal, and not be tempted into formulating general principles of a broader nature. If restitution lawyers are hoping to find in your Lordships' speeches broad statements of principle which may definitively establish the future shape of this part of the law, I fear that they may be disappointed. I also regard it as important that your Lordships should, in the traditional manner, pay particular regard to the practical consequences which may flow from the decision of the House.
With these observations by way of preamble, I turn to the question of the availability of an equitable proprietary claim in a case such as the present. The argument advanced on behalf of the bank was that the money paid by it under the void contract was received by the council subject to a resulting trust. This approach was consistent with that of Dillon L.J. in the Court of Appeal: see  1 W.L.R. 938, 947. It is also consistent with the approach of Viscount Haldane L.C. (with whom Lord Atkinson agreed) in Sinclair v. Brougham A.C. 398, 420-421.
I have already expressed the opinion that, at first sight, it is surprising that an equitable proprietary claim should be available in a case such as the present. However, before I examine the question as a matter of principle, I propose first to consider whether Sinclair v. Brougham supports the argument now advanced on behalf of the bank.
Sinclair v. Brougham
The decision of this House in Sinclair v. Brougham has loomed very large in both the judgments in the courts below and in the admirable arguments addressed to the Appellate Committee of this House. It has long been regarded as a controversial decision, and has been the subject of much consideration by scholars, especially those working in the field of restitution. I have however reached the conclusion that it is basically irrelevant to the decision of the present appeal.
It is first necessary to establish what the case was about. The Birkbeck Permanent Benefit Building Society decided to set up a banking business, known as the Birkbeck Bank. The banking business was however held to be ultra vires the objects of the building society; and there followed a spate of litigation concerned with solving the problems consequent upon that decision. Sinclair v. Brougham was one of those cases.
The case has been analysed in lucid detail in the speech of my noble and learned friend, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, which I have read (in draft) with great respect. In its bare outline, it was concerned with the distribution of the assets of the society, which was insolvent. There were four classes of claimants. First, there were two classes of shareholders - the A shareholders (entitled to repayment of their investment on maturity) and the B shareholders (whose shares were permanent). Next, there was a numerous class of people who had deposited money at the bank, under contracts which were ultra vires and so void. Finally, there were the ordinary trade creditors of the society. By agreement, the A shareholders and the trade creditors were paid off first, leaving only the claims of the depositors and the B shareholders. There were sufficient assets to pay off the B shareholders, but not the depositors and certainly not both. The687question of how to reconcile their competing claims arose for consideration on a summons by the liquidator for directions.
The problem arose from the fact that the contracts under which the depositors deposited their money at the bank were ultra vires and so void. That prevented them from establishing a simple contractual right to be repaid, in which event they would have ranked with the ordinary trade creditors of the society in the liquidation. As it was, they claimed to be entitled to repayment in an action for money had and received - in the same way as the bank claimed repayment in the case now before your Lordships. But the House of Lords held that they were not entitled to claim on this ground. This was in substance because to allow such a claim would permit an indirect enforcement of the contract which the policy of the law had decreed should be void. In those days, of course, judges still spoke about the common law right to restitution in the language of implied contract, and so we find Lord Sumner saying in a much quoted passage, at p. 452:
"To hold otherwise would be indirectly to sanction an ultra vires borrowing. All these causes of action are common species of the genus assumpsit. All now rest, and long have rested, upon a notional or imputed promise to repay. The law cannot de jure impute promises to repay, whether for money had and received or otherwise, which, if made de facto, it would inexorably avoid."
This conclusion however created a serious problem because, if the depositors had no claim, then, in the words of Lord Dunedin, at p. 436:
"The appalling result in this very case would be that the society's shareholders, having got proceeds of the depositors' money in the form of investments, so that each individual depositor is utterly unable to trace his money, are enriched to the extent of some 500 per cent."
As a matter of practical justice, such a result was obviously unacceptable; and it was to achieve justice that the House had recourse to equity to provide the answer. It is, I think, apparent from the reasoning of the members of the Appellate Committee that they regarded themselves, not as laying down some broad general principle, but as solving a particular practical problem. In this connection it is, in my opinion, significant that there was a considerable variation in the way in which they approached the problem. Viscount Haldane L.C., with whom Lord Atkinson agreed, did so, at p. 421, on the basis that there arose in the circumstances "a resulting trust, not of an active character." Lord Dunedin based his decision upon a broad equity of restitution, drawn from Roman and French law. He asked himself the question, at p. 435: "Is English equity to retire defeated from the task which other systems of equity have conquered?" - a question which he answered in the negative. Lord Parker of Waddington, at pp. 441-442, attempted to reconcile his decision with the established principles of equity by holding that the depositors' money had been received by the directors of the society as fiduciaries, with the effect that the depositors could thereafter follow their money in equity into the assets of the society. Lord Sumner, at p. 458, considered that the688case should be decided on equitable principles on which there was no direct authority. He regarded the question as one of administration, in which "the most just distribution of the whole must be directed, so only that no recognised rule of law or equity be disregarded." Setting on one side the opinion of Lord Parker, whose approach I find very difficult to reconcile with the facts of the case, I do not discern in the speeches of the members of the Appellate Committee any intention to impose a trust carrying with it the personal duties of a trustee.
For present purposes, I approach this case in the following way. First, it is clear that the problem which arose in Sinclair v. Brougham, viz. that a personal remedy in restitution was excluded on grounds of public policy, does not arise in the present case, which is not of course concerned with a borrowing contract. Second, I regard the decision in Sinclair v. Brougham as being a response to that problem in the case of ultra vires borrowing contracts, and as not intended to create a principle of general application. From this it follows, in my opinion, that Sinclair v. Brougham is not relevant to the decision in the present case. In particular it cannot be relied upon as a precedent that a trust arises on the facts of the present case, justifying on that basis an award of compound interest against the council.
But I wish to add this. I do not in any event think that it would be right for your Lordships' House to exercise its power under the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) 1 W.L.R. 1234 to depart from Sinclair v. Brougham. I say this first because, in my opinion, any decision to do so would not be material to the disposal of the present appeal, and would therefore be obiter. But there is a second reason of substance why, in my opinion, that course should not be taken. I recognise that nowadays cases of incapacity are relatively rare, though the swaps litigation shows that they can still occur. Even so, the question could still arise whether, in the case of a borrowing contract rendered void because it was ultra vires the borrower, it would be contrary to public policy to allow a personal claim in restitution. Such a question has arisen in the past not only in relation to associations such as the Birkbeck Permanent Benefit Building Society, but also in relation to infants' contracts. Moreover there is a respectable body of opinion that, if such a case arose today, it should still be held that public policy would preclude a personal claim in restitution, though not of course by reference to an implied contract. That was the opinion expressed by Leggatt L.J. in the Court of Appeal in the present case  1 W.L.R. 938, 952E-F, as it had been by Hobhouse J.; and the same view has been expressed by Professor Birks (see An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985), p. 374). I myself incline to the opinion that a personal claim in restitution would not indirectly enforce the ultra vires contract, for such an action would be unaffected by any of the contractual terms governing the borrowing, and moreover would be subject (where appropriate) to any available restitutionary defences. If my present opinion were to prove to be correct then Sinclair v. Brougham will fade into history. If not, then recourse can at least be had to Sinclair v. Brougham as authority for the proposition that, in such circumstances, the lender should not be without a remedy. Indeed, I cannot think that English law, or equity, is so impoverished as to be incapable of providing relief in such689circumstances. Lord Wright, who wrote in strong terms ("Sinclair v. Brougham" (1938) 6 C.L.J. 305) endorsing the just result in Sinclair v. Brougham, would turn in his grave at any such suggestion. Of course, it may be necessary to reinterpret the decision in that case to provide a more satisfactory basis for it; indeed one possible suggestion has been proposed by Professor Birks (see An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, pp. 396 et seq.). But for the present the case should in my opinion stand, though confined in the manner I have indicated, as an assertion that those who are caught in the trap of advancing money under ultra vires borrowing contracts will not be denied appropriate relief.
The availability of an equitable proprietary claim in the present case
Having put Sinclair v. Brougham on one side as providing no authority that a resulting trust should be imposed in the facts of the present case, I turn to the question whether, as a matter of principle, such a trust should be imposed, the bank's submission being that such a trust arose at the time when the sum of £2.5m. was received by the council from the bank.
As my noble and learned friend, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, observes, it is plain that the present case falls within neither of the situations which are traditionally regarded as giving rise to a resulting trust, viz. (1) voluntary payments by A to B, or for the purchase of property in the name of B or in his and A's joint names, where there is no presumption of advancement or evidence of intention to make an out-and-out gift; or (2) property transferred to B on an express trust which does not exhaust the whole beneficial interest. The question therefore arises whether resulting trusts should be extended beyond such cases to apply in the present case, which I shall treat as a case where money has been paid for a consideration which fails.
In a most interesting and challenging paper, "Restitution and Resulting Trusts," published in Equity: Contemporary Legal Developments (1992) (ed. Goldstein), p. 335, Professor Birks has argued for a wider role for the resulting trust in the field of restitution, and specifically for its availability in cases of mistake and failure of consideration. His thesis is avowedly experimental, written to test the temperature of the water. I feel bound to respond that the temperature of the water must be regarded as decidedly cold: see, e.g., Professor Burrows, "Swaps and the Friction between Common Law and Equity"  R.L.R. 15, and Mr. W. J. Swadling, "A new role for resulting trusts?" (1996) 16 Legal Studies 133.
In the first place, as Lord Browne-Wilkinson points out, to impose a resulting trust in such cases is inconsistent with the traditional principles of trust law. For on receipt of the money by the payee it is to be presumed that (as in the present case) the identity of the money is immediately lost by mixing with other assets of the payee, and at that time the payee has no knowledge of the facts giving rise to the failure of consideration. By the time that those facts come to light, and the conscience of the payee may thereby be affected, there will therefore be no identifiable fund to which a trust can attach. But there are other difficulties. First, there is no general rule that the property in money paid under a void contract does not pass to the payee; and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, as a690 general rule, the beneficial interest in the money likewise passes to the payee.
This must certainly be the case where the consideration for the payment fails after the payment is made, as in cases of frustration or breach of contract; and there appears to be no good reason why the same should not apply in cases where, as in the present case, the contract under which the payment is made is void ab initio and the consideration for the payment therefore fails at the time of payment. It is true that the doctrine of mistake might be invoked where the mistake is fundamental in the orthodox sense of that word. But that is not the position in the present case; moreover the mistake in the present case must be classified as a mistake of law which, as the law at present stands, creates its own special problems. No doubt that much criticised doctrine will fall to be reconsidered when an appropriate case occurs; but I cannot think that the present is such a case, since not only has the point not been argued but (as will appear) it is my opinion that there is any event jurisdiction to award compound interest in the present case. For all of these reasons I conclude, in agreement with my noble and learned friend, that there is no basis for holding that a resulting trust arises in cases where money has been paid under a contract which is ultra vires and therefore void ab initio. This conclusion has the effect that all the practical problems which would flow from the imposition of a resulting trust in a case such as the present, in particular the imposition upon the recipient of the normal duties of trustee, do not arise. The dramatic consequences which would occur are detailed by Professor Burrows in his article on "Swaps and the Friction between Common Law and Equity"  R.L.R. 15, 27: the duty to account for profits accruing from the trust property; the inability of the payee to rely upon the defence of change of position; the absence of any limitation period; and so on. Professor Burrows even goes so far as to conclude that the action for money had and received would be rendered otiose in such cases, and indeed in all cases where the payer seeks restitution of mistaken payments. However, if no resulting trust arises, it also follows that the payer in a case such as the present cannot achieve priority over the payee's general creditors in the event of his insolvency - a conclusion which appears to me to be just.
For all these reasons I conclude that there is no basis for imposing a resulting trust in the present case, and I therefore reject the bank's submission that it was here entitled to proceed by way of an equitable proprietary claim. I need only add that, in reaching that conclusion, I do not find it necessary to review the decision of Goulding J. in Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. v. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. Ch. 105.
It is against that background that I turn to consider the question of compound interest. Here there are three points which fall to be considered. These are (1) whether the court had jurisdiction to award compound interest; (2) if so, whether it should have exercised its jurisdiction to make such an award in the present case; and (3) from what date should such an award of compound interest run, if made.
It is common ground that in a case such as the present there is no jurisdiction to award compound interest at common law or by statute.691 The central question in the present case is therefore whether there is jurisdiction in equity to do so. It was held below, on the basis that the bank was entitled to succeed not only in a personal claim at common law but also in a proprietary claim in equity, that there was jurisdiction in equity to make an order that the council should pay compound interest on the sum adjudged due. It was that jurisdiction which was exercised by Hobhouse J., whose decision on the point was not challenged before the Court of Appeal, on the basis that Sinclair v. Brougham A.C. 398 provided binding authority that a proprietary claim was available to the bank in this case. However since, in my opinion, Sinclair v. Brougham provides no such authority, and no proprietary claim is available to the bank, the question now arises whether the equitable jurisdiction to award compound interest may nevertheless be exercised on the facts of the present case.
I wish however to record that Hobhouse J. was in no doubt that, if he had jurisdiction to do so, he should award compound interest in this case. He said  4 All E.R. 890, 955:
"Anyone who lends or borrows money on a commercial basis receives or pays interest periodically and if that interest is not paid it is compounded. . . . I see no reason why I should deny the plaintiff a complete remedy or allow the defendant arbitrarily to retain part of the enrichment which it has unjustly enjoyed."
With that reasoning I find myself to be in entire agreement. The council has had the use of the bank's money over a period of years. It is plain on the evidence that, if it had not had the use of the bank's money, it would (if free to do so) have borrowed the money elsewhere at compound interest. It has to that extent profited from the use of the bank's money. Moreover, if the bank had not advanced the money to the council, it would itself have employed the money on similar terms in its business. Full restitution requires that, on the facts of the present case, compound interest should be awarded, having regard to the commercial realities of the case. As the judge said, there is no reason why the bank should be denied a complete remedy.
It follows therefore that everything depends on the scope of the equitable jurisdiction. It also follows, in my opinion, that if that jurisdiction does not extend to apply in a case such as the present, English law will be revealed as incapable of doing full justice.
It is right that I should record that the scope of the equitable jurisdiction was not explored in depth in the course of argument before the Appellate Committee, in which attention was concentrated on the question whether a proprietary claim was available to the bank in the circumstances of the present case. In other circumstances, it might well have been appropriate to invite further argument on the point. However, since it was indicated to the Committee that the council was not prepared to spend further money on the appeal, whereupon it took no further part in the proceedings, and since the relevant authorities had been cited to the Committee, I am satisfied that it is appropriate that the point should now be decided by your Lordships' House.
I wish also to record that I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend, Lord Woolf, and that I find myself to be in agreement with his reasoning and conclusion on the point. Even so, I propose to set out in my own words my reasons for reaching the same conclusion.
I shall begin by expressing two preliminary thoughts. The first is that, where the jurisdiction of the court derives from common law or equity, and is designed to do justice in cases which come before the courts, it is startling to be faced by an argument that the jurisdiction is so restricted as to prevent the courts from doing justice. Jurisdiction of that kind should as a matter of principle be as broad as possible, to enable justice to be done wherever necessary; and the relevant limits should be found not in the scope of the jurisdiction but in the manner of its exercise as the principles are worked out from case to case. Second, I find it equally startling to find that the jurisdiction is said to be limited to certain specific categories of case. Where jurisdiction is founded on a principle of justice, I would expect that the categories of case where it is exercised should be regarded not as occupying the whole field but rather as emanations of the principle, so that the possibility of the jurisdiction being extended to other categories of case is not foreclosed.
It is with these thoughts in mind that I turn to the equitable jurisdiction to award interest. In President of India v. la Pintada Compania Navigacion S.A. A.C. 104 Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, delivering a speech with which the other members of the Appellate Committee agreed, described the equitable jurisdiction in the following words, at p. 116:
"Chancery courts had further regularly awarded interest, including not only simple interest but also compound interest, when they thought that justice so demanded, that is to say in cases where money had been obtained and retained by fraud, or where it had been withheld or misapplied by a trustee or anyone else in a fiduciary position."
Later however he said that Courts of Chancery only awarded compound, as distinct from simple, interest in two special classes of case.
With great respect I myself consider that, if the jurisdiction to award compound interest is available where justice so demands, it cannot be so confined as to exclude any class of case simply because that class of case has not previously been recognised as falling within it. I prefer therefore to read the passage quoted from Lord Brandon's speech as Mason C.J. and Wilson J. read it in Hungerfords v. Walker(1989) 171 C.L.R. 125, 148, as providing examples (i.e., not exclusive examples) of the application of the underlying principle of justice.
Now it is true that the reported cases on the exercise of the equitable jurisdiction, which are by no means numerous, are concerned with cases of breach of duty by trustees and other fiduciaries. In Attorney-General v. Alford(1855) 4 De G.M. & G. 843, for example, which came before Lord Cranworth L.C., the question arose whether an executor and trustee, who had for several years retained in his hands trust funds which he ought to have invested, should be chargeable with interest in excess of the ordinary rate of simple interest. It was held that he should not be chargeable at a693higher rate. Lord Cranworth L.C. recognised that the court might in such a case impose interest at a higher rate, or even compound interest. But he observed that if so the court does not impose a penalty on the trustee. He said, at p. 851:
"What the court ought to do, I think, is to charge him only with the interest which he has received, or which it is justly entitled to say he ought to have received, or which it is so fairly to be presumed that he did receive that he is estopped from saying that he did not receive it."
In cases of misconduct which benefits the executor, however, the court may fairly infer that he used the money in speculation, and may, on the principle "In odium spoliatoris omnia praesumuntur," assume that he made a higher rate, if that was a reasonable conclusion.
Likewise in Burdick v. Garrick (1870) L.R. 5 Ch. App. 233, where a fiduciary agent held money of his principal and simply paid it into his bank account, it was held that he should be charged with simple interest only. Lord Hatherley L.C., at pp. 241-242, applied the principle laid down in Attorney-General v. Alford, namely that:
"the court does not proceed against an accounting party by way of punishing him for making use of the plaintiff's money by directing rests, or payment of compound interest, but proceeds upon this principle, either that he has made, or has put himself in such a position that he is to be presumed to have made, 5 per cent., or compound interest, as the case may be. If the court finds . . . that the money received has been invested in an ordinary trade, the whole course of decision has tended to this, that the court presumes that the party against whom relief is sought has made that amount of profit which persons ordinarily do make in trade, and in those cases the court directs rests to be made."
For a more recent case in which the equitable jurisdiction was invoked, see Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2) Q.B. 373.
From these cases it can be seen that compound interest may be awarded in cases where the defendant has wrongfully profited, or may be presumed to have so profited, from having the use of another person's money. The power to award compound interest is therefore available to achieve justice in a limited area of what is now seen as the law of restitution, viz. where the defendant has acquired a benefit through his wrongful act (see Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution, 4th ed. (1993), pp. 632 et seq.; Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, pp. 313 et seq.; Burrows, The Law of Restitution (1993), pp. 403 et seq.). The general question arises whether the jurisdiction must be kept constrained in this way, or whether it may be permitted to expand so that it can be exercised to ensure that full justice can be done elsewhere in that rubric of the law. The particular question is whether the jurisdiction can be exercised in a case such as the present in which the council has been ordered to repay the balance of the bank's money on the ground of unjust enrichment, in a personal claim at common law.
At this stage of the argument I wish to stress two things. The first is that it is plain that the jurisdiction may, in an appropriate case, be694 exercised in the case of a personal claim in equity. In both Alford's case and Burdick v. Garrick, the cases were concerned with the taking of an account, and an order for payment of the sum found due. In each case the accounting party was a fiduciary, who held the relevant funds on trust. But the jurisdiction is not limited to cases in which a proprietary claim is being made and an award of interest is sought as representing the fruits of the property so claimed. On the contrary, the jurisdiction is in personam, and moreover an award of interest may be made not only where the trustee or fiduciary has made a profit, but also where it is held that he ought to have made a profit and has not done so. Furthermore in my opinion the decision of the Court of Appeal in In Re Diplock; Diplock v. Wintle  Ch. 465 provides no authority for the proposition that there is no jurisdiction to award compound interest where the claim is a personal claim. It is true that in that case the Court of Appeal decided not to award interest against a number of charities which had been held liable, in a personal claim in equity, to repay legacies which had been paid to them in error. But in so doing the court simply followed an old decision of Lord Eldon L.C. in Gittins v. Steele (1818) 1 Swan. 199, in which his judgment was as follows, at p. 200:
"Where the fund out of which the legacy ought to have been paid is in the hands of the court making interest, unquestionably interest is due. If a legacy has been erroneously paid to a legatee who has no farther property in the estate, in recalling that payment I apprehend that the rule of the court is not to charge interest; but if the legatee is entitled to another fund making interest in the hands of the court, justice must be done out of his share."
The Court of Appeal in In Re Diplock can have had no desire to make an award of interest against the charities in the personal claim against them in that case, and they must have been very content to follow uncritically this old "rule of court." But it does not follow that the rule of court went to the jurisdiction of the court. It is more likely that it represented an established practice which, as Lord Eldon L.C.'s brief judgment indicates, was subject to exceptions. In any event the Court of Appeal was there concerned only with simple interest; and in cases of the kind there under consideration, it seems unlikely that any question of an award of compound interest would ever have arisen.
I must confess that I find the reasoning which would restrict the equitable jurisdiction to award compound interest to cases where the claim is proprietary in nature to be both technical and unrealistic. This is shown by the reasoning and conclusion of Hobhouse J. in Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council 4 All E.R. 972, another swap transaction case, in which the plaintiff bank had no proprietary claim. The judge upheld the submission of the defendant council that, although they were under a personal liability to make restitution both at law and in equity, nevertheless the court had no jurisdiction to award compound interest on the sum adjudged due. He said, at p. 994:
"If . . . the plaintiff is only entitled to a personal remedy which will be the case where, although there was initially a fiduciary relationship695 and the payer was entitled in equity to treat the sum received by the payee as his, the payer's, money and to trace it, but because of subsequent developments he is no longer able to trace the sum in the hands of the payee, then there is no subject matter to which the rationale on which compound interest is awarded can be applied. The payee cannot be shown to have a fund belonging to the payer or to have used it to make profits for himself."
This reasoning is logical, assuming the restricted nature of the equitable jurisdiction to award compound interest. But if, as Lord Brandon in President of India v. la Pintada Compania Navigacion S.A. A.C. 104, 116 stated, the jurisdiction is founded upon the demands of justice, it is difficult to see the sense of the distinction which Hobhouse J. felt compelled to draw. It seems strange indeed that, just because the power to trace property has ceased, the court's jurisdiction to award compound interest should also come to an end. For where the claim is based upon the unjust enrichment of the defendant, it may be necessary to have power to award compound interest to achieve full restitution, i.e. to do full justice, as much where the plaintiff's claim is personal as where his claim is proprietary in nature. Furthermore, I know of no authority which compelled Hobhouse J. to hold that he had no jurisdiction to award compound interest in respect of the personal claim in equity in the case before him.
For these reasons I am satisfied that there is jurisdiction in equity to award compound interest in the case of personal claims as well as proprietary claims.
I turn next to the question whether the equitable jurisdiction can be exercised in aid of common law remedies such as, for example, a personal remedy in restitution, to repair the deficiencies of the common law. Here I turn at once to Snell's Equity, 29th ed. (1990), p. 28, where the first maxim of equity is stated to be that "Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy." The commentary on this maxim in the text reads:
"The idea expressed in this maxim is that no wrong should be allowed to go unredressed if it is capable of being remedied by courts of justice, and this really underlies the whole jurisdiction of equity. As already explained, the common law courts failed to remedy many undoubted wrongs, and this failure led to the establishment of the Court of Chancery. But is must not be supposed that every moral wrong was redressed by the Court of Chancery. The maxim must be taken as referring to rights which are suitable for judicial enforcement, but were not enforced at common law owing to some technical defect."
To this maxim is attributed the auxiliary jurisdiction of equity. The commentary reads:
"Again, to this maxim may be traced the origin of the auxiliary jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, by virtue of which suitors at law were aided in the enforcement of their legal rights. Without such aid these rights would often have been 'wrongs without remedies.' For instance, it was often necessary for a plaintiff in a common law696 action to obtain discovery of facts resting in the knowledge of the defendant, or of deeds, writings or other things in his possession or power. The common law courts, however, had no power to order such discovery, and recourse was therefore had to the Court of Chancery, which assumed jurisdiction to order the defendant to make discovery on his oath."
The question which arises in the present case is whether, in the exercise of equity's auxiliary jurisdiction, the equitable jurisdiction to award compound interest may be exercised to enable a plaintiff to obtain full justice in a personal action of restitution at common law.
I start with the position that the common law remedy is, in a case such as the present, plainly inadequate, in that there is no power to award compound interest at common law and that without that power the common law remedy is incomplete. The situation is therefore no different from that in which, in the absence of jurisdiction at common law to order discovery, equity stepped in to enable justice to be done in common law actions by ordering the defendant to make discovery on oath. The only difference between the two cases is that, whereas the equitable jurisdiction to order discovery in aid of common law actions was recognised many years ago, the possibility of the equitable jurisdiction to award compound interest being exercised in aid of common law actions was not addressed until the present case. Fortunately, however, judges of equity have always been ready to address new problems, and to create new doctrines, where justice so requires. As Sir George Jessel M.R. said, in a famous passage in his judgment in In Re Hallett's Estate; Knatchbull v. Hallett (1880) 13 Ch.D. 696, 710:
"I intentionally say modern rules, because it must not be forgotten that the rules of courts of equity are not, like the rules of the common law, supposed to have been established from time immemorial. It is perfectly well known that they have been established from time to time - altered, improved, and refined from time to time. In many cases we know the names of the Chancellors who invented them. No doubt they were invented for the purpose of securing the better administration of justice, but still they were invented."
I therefore ask myself whether there is any reason why the equitable jurisdiction to award compound interest should not be exercised in a case such as the present. I can see none. Take, for example, the case of fraud. It is well established that the equitable jurisdiction may be exercised in cases of fraud. Indeed it is plain that, on the same facts, there may be a remedy both at law and in equity to recover money obtained by fraud: see Johnson v. the King A.C. 817, 822, per Lord Macnaghten. Is it to be said that, if the plaintiff decides to proceed in equity, compound interest may be awarded; but that if he chooses to proceed in an action at law, no such auxiliary relief will be available to him? I find it difficult to believe that, at the end of the 20th century, our law should be so hidebound by forms of action as to be compelled to reach such a conclusion.
For these reasons I conclude that the equitable jurisdiction to award compound interest may be exercised in the case of personal claims at697 common law, as it is in equity. Furthermore I am satisfied that, in particular, the equitable jurisdiction may, where appropriate, be exercised in the case of a personal claim in restitution. In reaching that conclusion, I am of the opinion that the decision of Hobhouse J. in Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council 4 All E.R. 972 that the court had no such jurisdiction should not be allowed to stand.
I recognise that, in so holding, the courts would be breaking new ground, and would be extending the equitable jurisdiction to a field where it has not hitherto been exercised. But that cannot of itself be enough to prevent what I see to be a thoroughly desirable extension of the jurisdiction, consistent with its underlying basis that it exists to meet the demands of justice. An action of restitution appears to me to provide an almost classic case in which the jurisdiction should be available to enable the courts to do full justice. Claims in restitution are founded upon a principle of justice, being designed to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant: see Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. 2 A.C. 548. Long ago, in Moses v. Macferlan(1760) 2 Burr. 1005, 1012, Lord Mansfield C.J. said that the gist of the action for money had and received is that "the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money." It would be strange indeed if the courts lacked jurisdiction in such a case to ensure that justice could be fully achieved by means of an award of compound interest, where it is appropriate to make such an award, despite the fact that the jurisdiction to award such interest is itself said to rest upon the demands of justice. I am glad not to be forced to hold that English law is so inadequate as to be incapable of achieving such a result. In my opinion the jurisdiction should now be made available, as justice requires, in cases of restitution, to ensure that full justice can be done. The seed is there, but the growth has hitherto been confined within a small area. That growth should now be permitted to spread naturally elsewhere within this newly recognised branch of the law. No genetic engineering is required, only that the warm sun of judicial creativity should exercise its benign influence rather than remain hidden behind the dark clouds of legal history.
I wish to add that I for my part do not consider that the statutory power to award interest, either under section 3 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 or under section 35A of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (which, pursuant to section 15 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982, superseded section 3 of the Act of 1934), inhibits the course of action which I now propose. It is true that section 3(1) of the Act of 1934, when empowering courts of record to award interest in proceedings for the recovery of any debt or damages, did not authorise the giving of interest upon interest. But I cannot see that it would be inconsistent with the intention then expressed by Parliament later to extend the existing equitable jurisdiction to award compound interest to enable courts to ensure that full restitution is achieved in personal actions of restitution at common law. It is of course common knowledge that, until the latter part of this century, the existence of a systematic law of restitution, founded upon the principle of unjust enrichment, had not been recognised in English law. The question whether there should be a power698 to award compound interest in such cases, in order to achieve full restitution, simply did not arise in 1934 and cannot therefore have been considered by Parliament in that year. To hold that, because Parliament did not then authorise an award of compound interest in proceedings the nature of which was not then recognised, the courts should now be precluded from exercising the ordinary judicial power to develop the law by extending an existing jurisdiction to meet a newly recognised need appears to me to constitute an unnecessary and undesirable fetter upon the judicial development of the law. It is not to be forgotten that there is jurisdiction in equity, as well as at common law, to order restitution on the ground of unjust enrichment; and I cannot see that section 3(1) of the 1934 Act would have precluded any extension of the existing equitable jurisdiction to award compound interest to enable full restitution to be achieved in such a case. Accordingly neither would section 3(1), which applied to all courts of record, have precluded a similar extension of the jurisdiction to enable full restitution to be achieved in actions at common law. Section 35A of the Act of 1981 no doubt perpetuated the position as established by section 3(1) of the Act of 1934, in that it, too, did not confer a power on the courts to award compound interest; but I cannot see that this affects the position. In so far as it is relevant to refer to the Report of the Law Commission "Law of Contract: Report on Interest" (Law Com. No. 88) (Cmnd. 7229) of 7 April 1978 which preceded that enactment, it appears from the Report that it was generally opposed to the introduction of any general power to award compound interest; but there was no intention of interfering with the equitable jurisdiction, and the problem which has arisen in the present case was not addressed. I wish to add that such an extension of the equitable jurisdiction as I propose would, in my opinion, be a case of equity acting in aid of the common law. There is in my opinion no need, and indeed no basis, for outlawing such a development as a case of equity acting in aid of the legislature simply because the legislature, in conferring upon courts the power to award simple interest, did not authorise the giving of compound interest.
It remains for me to say that I am satisfied, for the reasons given by Hobhouse J., that this is a case in which it was appropriate that compound interest should be awarded. In particular, since the council had the free use of the bank's money in circumstances in which, if it had borrowed the money from some other financial institution, it would have had to pay compound interest for it, the council can properly be said to have profited from the bank's money so as to make an award of compound interest appropriate. However, for the reasons given by Dillon L.J.  1 W.L.R. 938, 947-949, I agree with the Court of Appeal that the interest should run from the date of receipt of the money.
For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal.
My Lords, in the last decade many local authorities entered into interest rate swap agreements with banks and other finance houses. In Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council 2 A.C. 1 your Lordships held that such contracts699 were ultra vires local authorities and therefore void. Your Lordships left open the question whether payments made pursuant to such swap agreements were recoverable or not. The action which is the subject matter of this appeal is one of a number in which the court has had to consider the extent to which moneys paid under such an agreement are recoverable.
An interest rate swap agreement is an agreement between two parties by which each agrees to pay the other on a specified date or dates an amount calculated by reference to the interest which would have accrued over a given period on a notional principal sum. The rate of interest payable by each party (on the same notional sum) is different. One rate of interest is usually fixed and does not change (and the payer is called "the fixed rate payer"); the other rate is a variable or floating rate based on a fluctuating interest rate such as the six-month London Inter-bank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") and the payer is known as "the floating rate payer." Normally the parties do not make the actual payments they have contracted for but the party owing the higher amount pays to the other party the difference between the two amounts.
In the present case the swap contract was concluded between the respondent bank, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale ("the bank"), and the appellant, the council of the London Borough of Islington ("the local authority"), on 16 June 1987. The arrangement was to run for 10 years starting on 18 June 1987. The interest sums were to be calculated on a notional principal sum of £25m. and were to be payable half-yearly. The bank was to be the fixed rate payer at a rate of 7.5 per cent. per annum and the local authority was to be the floating rate payer at the domestic sterling LIBOR rate. In addition, the bank was to pay to the local authority on 18 June 1987 a sum of £2.5m. ("the upfront payment") which payment was made. As a result of the provision of the upfront payment the rate of interest payable by the bank as the fixed rate payer was agreed to be lower than what would have been appropriate (9.43 per cent.) if the upfront payment had not been made.
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the following payments were made:
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
Therefore the payments made by the bank to the local authority exceed those made by the local authority to the bank to the extent of £1,145,525.93.
On 1 November 1989 the Divisional Court gave judgment in Hazell's case declaring void swap transactions entered into by local authorities.700 The decision applied to the contract between the parties in the present case.
As will appear it is of central importance to note the way in which the local authority dealt with the upfront payment of £2.5m. made to it on 18 June 1987. The money was credited to a bank account of the local authority in which there were other moneys of the local authority, i.e. into a mixed account. That account itself became overdrawn overnight on several dates in June and July 1987. There was an overall debit balance on the account on 16 November 1987. The moneys in the mixed account were used by the local authority for its general expenditure. If the upfront payment had not been received, the local authority would have had to borrow more money if it could. The local authority had been, and was likely to be in the future, rate-capped and one of the attractions to the local authority in the swap agreement was that it obtained the upfront payment in a form which did not attract statutory controls.
The bank in this action sought recovery of the amounts paid by it under the void agreement together with interest. On 12 February 1993 Hobhouse J.  4 All E.R. 890 gave judgment in the Commercial Court for the bank ordering payment by the local authority to the bank of the balance together with compound interest on the balance as from 1 April 1990 with six-monthly rests.
The council appealed to the Court of Appeal against that order and the bank cross-appealed contending that compound interest should have been ordered as from the date of receipt of the principal sum, i.e. 18 June 1987.
On 17 December 1993 the Court of Appeal (Dillon, Leggatt and Kennedy L.JJ.)  1 W.L.R. 938 dismissed the local authority's appeal and allowed the cross-appeal by the bank. It held that the bank was entitled to recover the balance at law as money had and received (Dillon L.J., at p. 946; Leggatt L.J., at p. 953E-F). It also held that the bank was entitled to recover the balance in equity on the ground that the local authority held the upfront payment on a resulting trust and was there- fore personally liable, as trustee, to repay the bank (Dillon L.J., at p. 947A-E; Leggatt L.J., at p. 953G-H). The Court of Appeal further held the local authority liable to pay compound interest on the balance from time to time outstanding as from the date of receipt of the upfront payment. The ability of the court to award compound, as opposed to simple, interest was founded on the equitable jurisdiction to award compound interest as against a trustee or other person owing fiduciary duties who is personally accountable and who has made use of the plaintiff's money: Dillon L.J., at pp. 949-951; Leggatt L.J., at pp. 953-955.
The local authority now accepts that it is personally liable to repay the balance to the bank. The local authority appeals to your Lordships only against the award of compound interest. But, as will appear, notwithstanding the narrow scope of the appeal it raises profound questions for decision by your Lordships.
Compound interest in equity
It is common ground that in the absence of agreement or custom the court has no jurisdiction to award compound interest either at law or701 under section 35A of the Supreme Court Act 1981. It is also common ground that in certain limited circumstances courts of equity can award compound interest. Mr. Philipson, for the local authority, contends that compound interest can only be ordered on a claim against a trustee or other person owing fiduciary duties who in breach of such duty has used trust moneys in his own trade. He contends that compound interest cannot be awarded in this case since (a) the local authority never held the upfront payment as a trustee or in a fiduciary capacity and (b) in any event the local authority did not use the upfront payment in its trade. Mr. Sumption, for the bank, contends that compound interest can be awarded in equity whenever the defendant is liable to disgorge a benefit received whether or not he is a trustee or a fiduciary. Alternatively, Mr. Sumption contends that the local authority did receive the upfront payment as a trustee and as such is in equity accountable for the benefits it has received, including the benefit of not having to borrow £2.5m. on the market at compound interest.
In the absence of fraud courts of equity have never awarded compound interest except against a trustee or other person owing fiduciary duties who is accountable for profits made from his position. Equity awarded simple interest at a time when courts of law had no right under common law or statute to award any interest. The award of compound interest was restricted to cases where the award was in lieu of an account of profits improperly made by the trustee. We were not referred to any case where compound interest had been awarded in the absence of fiduciary accountability for a profit. The principle is clearly stated by Lord Hatherley L.C. in Burdick v. Garrick, L.R. 5 Ch.App. 233, 241:
"the court does not proceed against an accounting party by way of punishing him for making use of the plaintiff's money by directing rests, or payment of compound interest, but proceeds upon this principle, either that he has made, or has put himself into such a position as that he is to be presumed to have made, 5 per cent., or compound interest, as the case may be."
The principle was more fully stated by Buckley L.J. in Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2) Q.B. 373, 397:
"Where a trustee has retained trust money in his own hands, he will be accountable for the profit which he has made or which he is assumed to have made from the use of the money. In Attorney- General v. Alford, 4 De G.M. & G. 843, 851 Lord Cranworth L.C. said: 'What the court ought to do, I think, is to charge him only with the interest which he has received, or which it is justly entitled to say he ought to have received, or which it is so fairly to be presumed that he did receive that he is estopped from saying that he did not receive it.' This is an application of the doctrine that the court will not allow a trustee to make any profit from his trust. The defaulting trustee is normally charged with simple interest only, but if it is established that he has used the money in trade he may be charged compound interest. . . . The justification for charging compound interest normally lies in the fact that profits earned in trade would be likely to be used as working capital for earning further profits. Precisely similar equitable702 principles apply to an agent who has retained moneys of his principal in his hands and used them for his own purposes: Burdick v. Garrick."
In President of India v. la Pintada Compania Navigacion S.A. A.C. 104, 116 Lord Brandon of Oakbrook (with whose speech the rest of their Lordships agreed) considered the law as to the award of interest as at that date in four separate areas. His third area was equity, as to which he said:
"Thirdly, the area of equity. The Chancery courts, again differing from the common law courts, had regularly awarded simple interest as ancillary relief in respect of equitable remedies, such as specific performance, rescission and the taking of an account. Chancery courts had further regularly awarded interest, including not only simple interest but also compound interest, when they thought that justice so demanded, that is to say in cases where money had been obtained and retained by fraud, or where it had been withheld or misapplied by a trustee or anyone else in a fiduciary position. . . . Courts of Chancery only in two special classes of case, awarded compound, as distinct from simple, interest."
These authorities establish that in the absence of fraud equity only awards compound (as opposed to simple) interest against a defendant who is a trustee or otherwise in a fiduciary position by way of recouping from such a defendant an improper profit made by him. It is unnecessary to decide whether in such a case compound interest can only be paid where the defendant has used trust moneys in his own trade or (as I tend to think) extends to all cases where a fiduciary has improperly profited from his trust. Unless the local authority owed fiduciary duties to the bank in relation to the upfront payment, compound interest cannot be awarded.
Was there a trust? The argument for the bank in outline
The bank submitted that, since the contract was void, title did not pass at the date of payment either at law or in equity. The legal title of the bank was extinguished as soon as the money was paid into the mixed account, whereupon the legal title became vested in the local authority. But, it was argued, this did not affect the equitable interest, which remained vested in the bank ("the retention of title point"). It was submitted that whenever the legal interest in property is vested in one person and the equitable interest in another, the owner of the legal interest holds it on trust for the owner of the equitable title: "the separation of the legal from the equitable interest necessarily imports a trust." For this latter proposition ("the separation of title point") the bank, of course, relies on Sinclair v. Brougham A.C. 398 and Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. v. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. Ch. 105.
The generality of these submissions was narrowed by submitting that the trust which arose in this case was a resulting trust "not of an active character:" see per Viscount Haldane L.C. in Sinclair v. Brougham A.C. 398, 421. This submission was reinforced, after completion of the oral argument, by sending to your Lordships Professor Peter Birks's paper "Restitution and Resulting Trusts:" see Equity: Contemporary Legal 703 Developments, p. 335. Unfortunately your Lordships have not had the advantage of any submissions from the local authority on this paper, but an article by William Swadling "A new role for resulting trusts?" 16 Legal Studies 133 puts forward counter-arguments which I have found persuasive.
It is to be noted that the bank did not found any argument on the basis that the local authority was liable to repay either as a constructive trustee or under the in personam liability of the wrongful recipient of the estate of a deceased person established by In Re Diplock; Diplock v. Wintle  Ch. 465. I therefore do not further consider those points.
The breadth of the submission
Although the actual question in issue on the appeal is a narrow one, on the arguments presented it is necessary to consider fundamental principles of trust law. Does the recipient of money under a contract subsequently found to be void for mistake or as being ultra vires hold the moneys received on trust even where he had no knowledge at any relevant time that the contract was void? If he does hold on trust, such trust must arise at the date of receipt or, at the latest, at the date the legal title of the payer is extinguished by mixing moneys in a bank account: in the present case it does not matter at which of those dates the legal title was extinguished. If there is a trust two consequences follow: (a) the recipient will be personally liable, regardless of fault, for any subsequent payment away of the moneys to third parties even though, at the date of such payment, the "trustee" was still ignorant of the existence of any trust: see Burrows, "Swaps and the Friction between Common Law and Equity"  R.L.R. 15; (b) as from the date of the establishment of the trust (i.e. receipt or mixing of the moneys by the "trustee") the original payer will have an equitable proprietary interest in the moneys so long as they are traceable into whomsoever's hands they come other than a purchaser for value of the legal interest without notice. Therefore, although in the present case the only question directly in issue is the personal liability of the local authority as a trustee, it is not possible to hold the local authority liable without imposing a trust which, in other cases, will create property rights affecting third parties because moneys received under a void contract are "trust property."
The practical consequences of the bank's argument
Before considering the legal merits of the submission, it is important to appreciate the practical consequences which ensue if the bank's arguments are correct. Those who suggest that a resulting trust should arise in these circumstances accept that the creation of an equitable proprietary interest under the trust can have unfortunate, and adverse, effects if the original recipient of the moneys becomes insolvent: the moneys, if traceable in the hands of the recipient, are trust moneys and not available for the creditors of the recipient. However, the creation of an equitable proprietary interest in moneys received under a void contract is capable of having adverse effects quite apart from insolvency. The proprietary interest under the unknown trust will, quite apart from704 insolvency, be enforceable against any recipient of the property other than the purchaser for value of a legal interest without notice.
Take the following example. T (the transferor) has entered into a commercial contract with R1 (the first recipient). Both parties believe the contract to be valid but it is in fact void. Pursuant to that contract: (i) T pays £1m. to R1 who pays it into a mixed bank account; (ii) T transfers 100 shares in X company to R1, who is registered as a shareholder. Thereafter R1 deals with the money and shares as follows: (iii) R1 pays £50,000 out of the mixed account to R2 otherwise than for value; R2 then becomes insolvent, having trade creditors who have paid for goods not delivered at the time of the insolvency; (iv) R1 charges the shares in X company to R3 by way of equitable security for a loan from R3.
If the bank's arguments are correct, R1 holds the £1m. on trust for T once the money has become mixed in R1's bank account. Similarly R1 becomes the legal owner of the shares in X company as from the date of his registration as a shareholder but holds such shares on a resulting trust for T. T therefore has an equitable proprietary interest in the moneys in the mixed account and in the shares.
T's equitable interest will enjoy absolute priority as against the creditors in the insolvency of R2 (who was not a purchaser for value) provided that the £50,000 can be traced in the assets of R2 at the date of its insolvency. Moreover, if the separation of title argument is correct, since the equitable interest is in T and the legal interest is vested in R2, R2 also holds as trustee for T. In tracing the £50,000 in the bank account of R2, R2 as trustee will be treated as having drawn out "his own" moneys first, thereby benefiting T at the expense of the secured and unsecured creditors of R2. Therefore in practice one may well reach the position where the moneys in the bank account of R2 in reality reflect the price paid by creditors for goods not delivered by R2: yet, under the tracing rules, those moneys are to be treated as belonging in equity to T.
So far as the shares in the X company are concerned, T can trace his equitable interest into the shares and will take in priority to R3, whose equitable charge to secure his loan even though granted for value will pro tanto be defeated.
All this will have occurred when no one was aware, or could have been aware, of the supposed trust because no one knew that the contract was void.
I can see no moral or legal justification for giving such priority to the right of T to obtain restitution over third parties who have themselves not been enriched, in any real sense, at T's expense and indeed have had no dealings with T. T paid over his money and transferred the shares under a supposed valid contract. If the contract had been valid, he would have had purely personal rights against R1. Why should he be better off because the contract is void?
My Lords, wise judges have often warned against the wholesale importation into commercial law of equitable principles inconsistent with the certainty and speed which are essential requirements for the orderly conduct of business affairs: see Barnes v. Addy (1874) L.R. 9 Ch.App. 244, 251 and 255; Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. A.B. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana 2 A.C. 694, 703-704. If the bank's arguments are705 correct, a businessman who has entered into transactions relating to or dependent upon property rights could find that assets which apparently belong to one person in fact belong to another; that there are "off balance sheet" liabilities of which he cannot be aware; that these property rights and liabilities arise from circumstances unknown not only to himself but also to anyone else who has been involved in the transactions. A new area of unmanageable risk will be introduced into commercial dealings. If the due application of equitable principles forced a conclusion leading to these results, your Lordships would be presented with a formidable task in reconciling legal principle with commercial common sense. But in my judgment no such conflict occurs. The resulting trust for which the bank contends is inconsistent not only with the law as it stands but with any principled development of it.
The relevant principles of trust law
(i) Equity operates on the conscience of the owner of the legal interest. In the case of a trust, the conscience of the legal owner requires him to carry out the purposes for which the property was vested in him (express or implied trust) or which the law imposes on him by reason of his unconscionable conduct (constructive trust).
(ii) Since the equitable jurisdiction to enforce trusts depends upon the conscience of the holder of the legal interest being affected, he cannot be a trustee of the property if and so long as he is ignorant of the facts alleged to affect his conscience, i.e. until he is aware that he is intended to hold the property for the benefit of others in the case of an express or implied trust, or, in the case of a constructive trust, of the factors which are alleged to affect his conscience.
(iii) In order to establish a trust there must be identifiable trust property. The only apparent exception to this rule is a constructive trust imposed on a person who dishonestly assists in a breach of trust who may come under fiduciary duties even if he does not receive identifiable trust property.
(iv) Once a trust is established, as from the date of its establishment the beneficiary has, in equity, a proprietary interest in the trust property, which proprietary interest will be enforceable in equity against any subsequent holder of the property (whether the original property or substituted property into which it can be traced) other than a purchaser for value of the legal interest without notice.
These propositions are fundamental to the law of trusts and I would have thought uncontroversial. However, proposition (ii) may call for some expansion. There are cases where property has been put into the name of X without X's knowledge but in circumstances where no gift to X was intended. It has been held that such property is recoverable under a resulting trust: Birch v. Blagrave (1755) 1 Amb. 264; Childers v. Childers (1857) 1 De G. & J. 482; In Re Vinogradoff; Allen v. Jackson  W.N. 68; In Re Muller; Cassin v. Mutual Cash Order Co. Ltd.  N.Z.L.R. 879. These cases are explicable on the ground that, by the time action was brought, X or his successors in title have become aware of the facts which gave rise to a resulting trust; his conscience was affected as from the time of such discovery and thereafter he held on a resulting trust under which706 the property was recovered from him. There is, so far as I am aware, no authority which decides that X was a trustee, and therefore accountable for his deeds, at any time before he was aware of the circumstances which gave rise to a resulting trust.
Those basic principles are inconsistent with the case being advanced by the bank. The latest time at which there was any possibility of identifying the "trust property" was the date on which the moneys in the mixed bank account of the local authority ceased to be traceable when the local authority's account went into overdraft in June 1987. At that date, the local authority had no knowledge of the invalidity of the contract but regarded the moneys as its own to spend as it thought fit. There was therefore never a time at which both (a) there was defined trust property and (b) the conscience of the local authority in relation to such defined trust property was affected. The basic requirements of a trust were never satisfied.
I turn then to consider the bank's arguments in detail. They were based primarily on principle rather than on authority. I will deal first with the bank's argument from principle and then turn to the main authorities relied upon by the bank, Sinclair v. Brougham A.C. 398 and Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. v. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. Ch. 105.
The retention of title point
It is said that, since the bank only intended to part with its beneficial ownership of the moneys in performance of a valid contract, neither the legal nor the equitable title passed to the local authority at the date of payment. The legal title vested in the local authority by operation of law when the moneys became mixed in the bank account but, it is said, the bank "retained" its equitable title.
I think this argument is fallacious. A person solely entitled to the full beneficial ownership of money or property, both at law and in equity, does not enjoy an equitable interest in that property. The legal title carries with it all rights. Unless and until there is a separation of the legal and equitable estates, there is no separate equitable title. Therefore to talk about the bank "retaining" its equitable interest is meaningless. The only question is whether the circumstances under which the money was paid were such as, in equity, to impose a trust on the local authority. If so, an equitable interest arose for the first time under that trust.
This proposition is supported by In Re Cook; Beck v. Grant  Ch. 212; Vandervell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners 2 A.C. 291, 311G, per Lord Upjohn, and 317F, per Lord Donovan; Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v. Livingston A.C. 694, 712B-E; Underhill and Hayton, Law of Trusts and Trustees, 15th ed. (1995), p. 866.
The separation of title point
The bank's submission, at its widest, is that if the legal title is in A but the equitable interest in B, A holds as trustee for B.
Again I think this argument is fallacious. There are many cases where B enjoys rights which, in equity, are enforceable against the legal owner, A, without A being a trustee, e.g. an equitable right to redeem a mortgage,707 equitable easements, restrictive covenants, the right to rectification, an insurer's right by subrogation to receive damages subsequently recovered by the assured: Lord Napier and Ettrick v. Hunter  A.C. 713. Even in cases where the whole beneficial interest is vested in B and the bare legal interest is in A, A is not necessarily a trustee, e.g. where title to land is acquired by estoppel as against the legal owner; a mortgagee who has fully discharged his indebtedness enforces his right to recover the mortgaged property in a redemption action, not an action for breach of trust.
The bank contended that where, under a pre-existing trust, B is entitled to an equitable interest in trust property, if the trust property comes into the hands of a third party, X (not being a purchaser for value of the legal interest without notice), B is entitled to enforce his equitable interest against the property in the hands of X because X is a trustee for B. In my view the third party, X, is not necessarily a trustee for B: B's equitable right is enforceable against the property in just the same way as any other specifically enforceable equitable right can be enforced against a third party. Even if the third party, X, is not aware that what he has received is trust property B is entitled to assert his title in that property. If X has the necessary degree of knowledge, X may himself become a constructive trustee for B on the basis of knowing receipt. But unless he has the requisite degree of knowledge he is not personally liable to account as trustee: In Re Diplock; Diplock v. Wintle  Ch. 465, 478; In Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts  Ch. 264. Therefore, innocent receipt of property by X subject to an existing equitable interest does not by itself make X a trustee despite the severance of the legal and equitable titles. Underhill and Hayton, Law of Trusts and Trustees, pp. 369-370, whilst accepting that X is under no personal liability to account unless and until he becomes aware of B's rights, does describe X as being a constructive trustee. This may only be a question of semantics: on either footing, in the present case the local authority could not have become accountable for profits until it knew that the contract was void.
This is not a case where the bank had any equitable interest which pre-dated receipt by the local authority of the upfront payment. Therefore, in order to show that the local authority became a trustee, the bank must demonstrate circumstances which raised a trust for the first time either at the date on which the local authority received the money or at the date on which payment into the mixed account was made. Counsel for the bank specifically disavowed any claim based on a constructive trust. This was plainly right because the local authority had no relevant knowledge sufficient to raise a constructive trust at any time before the moneys, upon the bank account going into overdraft, became untraceable. Once there ceased to be an identifiable trust fund, the local authority could not become a trustee: In Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd.  1 A.C. 74. Therefore, as the argument for the bank recognised, the only possible trust which could be established was a resulting trust arising from the circumstances in which the local authority received the upfront payment.